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In this paper, the researcher examines the liability regime 
that governs the international aircraft carriers in the 
context of the recent Malaysian plane (MH 17) crash. The 
researcher analyses the efficacy of the Warsaw and 
Montreal Convention frameworks in affixing liability on 
the state parties. The international aviation regime as 
regulated by the ICAO and its inability to confirm legal 
responsibility is also dealt with in reference to the 
previous incidents of air crash. The paper concludes on a 
note that the international aviation regime is not 
adequately equipped to deal with questions of state 
responsibility for acts of unlawful interference with 
international civil aviation regime. 
Keywords: Aircraft Carriers, International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, Liability Regime, Montreal Convention, State 
Responsibility. 
Introduction 
The aviation industry is on a sharp ascent and the flow of traffic 
has increased with the advent of globalization.1As of 2014, the 
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aviation industry supports more than 58 million jobs and $2.1 
trillion of economic activity annually. In 2013, there were 3 billion 
passengers who chose to travel by air and a steady increase in air 
travel can be attributed to the fact that air travel is no longer 
perceived to be unsafe.2 
In order to protect the interests of the passengers in case of 
accidents or loss of baggage, the aircrafts are also liable to pay 
passengers adequate compensation. It was in furtherance of this 
objective that 108 nation states across the world have signed and 
ratified the Montreal Convention which imposes the liability for 
any losses incurred by the passengers on the aircraft carriers. It is a 
fair and uniform international regime to protect the interests of the 
passengers and the Convention came into force in 1999. Out of the 
191 contracting states who are parties to the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (hereinafter ICAO), only 108 contracting 
states have ratified this treaty and many passengers are still not 
under the protection of this treaty.3 
However, the current aviation regime is not void of glitches as only 
a bare minimum compensation is provided when the accidents on 
the aircrafts are not a result of the negligent acts of the air carrier. 
This paper seeks to examine this problem in the light of the recent 
Malaysian Airlines (MH 17) aircraft disaster in Ukraine which was 
shot down by the rebels who were controlling parts of Ukraine. 
This air disaster raises serious questions about the safety of 
passengers in the international skies that could affect the credibility 
of the aviation industry. This incident has potentially exposed to 
the whole world, the problems in the current international treaty 
regimes on passenger liability as the victims of this air disaster 
were not protected.  
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This is closely related to the flaws in the constitution of ICAO 
which is merely a regulatory body and does not have the necessary 
power to impose sanctions on contracting states for not taking 
necessary precautions to ensure the safety of passengers. In the first 
part of the paper, the researcher discusses the events that have led 
to the crash, following which the liability under the international 
treaty regimes are discussed in the second part. In the third part, 
the scope of liability on Malaysian Airlines under the Montreal 
Convention is analysed. In the fourth part, the paper examines the 
role of the ICAO in resolving the disputes on liability. The paper 
concludes by examining the changes that need to be made to the 
toothless ICAO. 
The ‘Other’ Tragedy in Crimea: How the MH 17 Went 
Down? 
The Malaysian Airlines Flight17 (MH 17) took off from the 
Amsterdam Airport, Schiphol on July 17, 2014 and was scheduled 
to arrive at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport. As per the 
flight plan, the aircraft was scheduled to fly over Ukraine at FL 350 
but it was later shifted to FL 330 to avoid potential conflict with the 
flight plan of another plane.4 As the flight approached the Crimean 
territory, the Dnipro Control had contacted the Russian air control 
for clearance for MH 17. They tried contacting MH 17and there was 
no response. The air control noticed that the Boeing 777 went 
missing from their radar at 4:54pm (Greenwich Mean Time) which 
was earlier cruising at 33,000 feet.5 
As a result of the Crimean crisis brewing in eastern Ukraine, many 
airlines began to avoid the airspace over Crimea. The ICAO had 
warned its members that commercial passengers would be at risk.6 
                                                          
4 MH 17: Malaysia Airlines Could Be Sued Over Flight Path, NEWS.COM.AU, 
(Sep. 21, 2014), http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/mh17-
malaysia-airlines-could-be-sued-over-flight-path/story-fnizu68q-
1227065232259. 
5 MH 17 Malaysia plane Crash in Ukraine: What We Know, BBC NEWS, (Sep. 
09, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28357880. 
6Luis Fonseca de Almeida, Safety of Civil Aircraft Operating in the Simferopol 
Flight Information Region (FIR), INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION 
ORGANISATION, (Apr. 2, 2014), available at http://www.ibac.org/wp-
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However, many reputed international airlines continued using this 
troubled airspace risking the lives of the passengers until the crash 
of MH 17. 
All the 283 passengers and 15 crew on board in the aircraft had 
died. Preliminary investigation reports had suggested that MH 17 
had crashed after being hit by a high velocity object.7 The 
Ukrainian government had accused the rebel forces of downing the 
plane using a Soviet era SA 11 ground-to-air missile and similar 
attacks were carried out on Ukrainian military aircrafts.8 
Eye witness account described that, the plane broke into two while 
in the air and crashed near Torez in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine. A 
preliminary investigation carried out by the Dutch investigators 
concluded that MH 17 was hit by „multiple high velocity objects.‟9 
According to the report, the pattern of damage observed did not 
indicate any failure of the aircraft and the aircraft was also in 
airworthy condition to make the flight to Kuala Lumpur. All crew 
on the aircraft were properly licensed and it clearly indicated that 
the crash was not a result of aircraft failure.10 
Since the crash had taken place over a conflict ridden area, none of 
the nation states took responsibility for the crash. The Ukrainian 
government had blamed the Russian backed rebels in Crimea 
calling this a terrorist attack. The rebel leaders have denied this, 
claiming that they lacked the weaponry to shoot down a Boeing 
777. 
In the light of the aforementioned circumstances, this paper will 
examine the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 
                                                                                                                                    
content/uploads/2010/06/14-0243-Safety-of-civil-aircraft-in-
Simferopol-FIR.pdf. 
7 Preliminary Safety Report: Crash involving Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777-200 
Flight MH 17, DUTCH SAFETY BOARD, 7 (Jul. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-
docs/701/b3923acad0ceprem-rapport-MH 17-en-interactief.pdf. 
8 Malaysian Airliner Downed in Ukraine War Zone, 295 dead, (Jul. 17, 2014), 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/17/us-ukraine-
crisis-airplane-idUSKBN0FM22N20140717. 
9  DUTCH SAFETY BOARD, supra note 7. 
10 DUTCH SAFETY BOARD, supra note 7. 
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International Carriage by Air also referred to as the Montreal 
Convention, 1999 in order to analyse the liability of the air carriers 
towards its passengers. 
Liability of Air Carriers under International Conventions 
The passengers in the aviation industry are the most vulnerable 
stakeholders. Any damage that arose from accidents during their 
flight journey was not governed by any legal mechanism until the 
signing of the Warsaw Convention in 1929.11 This was followed by 
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 
International Carriage by Air, 1999 signed at Montreal. 
These conventions address the problem of aircraft carriers‟ liability 
to the passengers on board international flights, for loss of lives in 
aircraft crashes, injuries to passengers, missing and misplaced. In 
this section, the paper will first discuss the Warsaw Convention 
and then examine the Montreal Convention. 
Warsaw Convention, 1929 
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air was signed at Warsaw in 1929 to 
regulate liability for international carriage of luggage, human 
beings or goods. It was further amended through The Hague 
Protocol, 1955 and The Guatemala City Protocol, 1971. 
One of the important elements of the Warsaw Convention was to 
limit the liability on the commercial airlines in case of liability. The 
primary objective of the Convention was to establish an 
international regime that will regulate the liability of aircrafts 
towards its passengers. However the upper limit on compensation 
was insufficient and the Convention was no longer fair and was 
against the interests of the passengers.  The compensation was so 
inadequate that the subsequent protocols at Hague and Guatemala 
had to increase the upper limit on aircraft liability. 
                                                          
11Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 available at 
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.warsaw.convention.1929/doc.h
tml. 
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The Warsaw regime continued to be unfair to the passengers. 
Under this Convention, there is a presumption that the airlines are 
liable for injuries or death of passengers. It must thus be shown 
that, the damage caused to the passenger was intentional and 
reckless, a standard of proof that is very high. However, the airlines 
can be shielded from liability if it is established that they had taken 
all necessary measures to avoid the damage.  
This can be seen as per Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention which 
states that, 
The carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his 
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid 
the damage or that it was impossible for him or 
them to take such measures.12 
This clearly indicates the limitations on the liability which the 
Convention imposes on commercial airliners. It leaves the 
passengers high and dry in circumstances where the situation falls 
in the grey areas. 
Further, this Convention does not provide any advance payments 
for the passengers to cover their urgent economic needs.13  This is 
necessary as the families would be under severe economic stress as 
a result of the losses they have incurred and to also due to the costs 
involved in litigation. 
Montreal Convention, 1999 
The position in Montreal Convention shifts considerably in favour 
of the passengers when it comes to the question of liability.14 This 
must be observed in the light of the booming aviation industry 
which gives primary importance to safety.  
                                                          
12Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 available at 
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/air.carriage.warsaw.convention.1929/doc.h
tml. 
13 Bin Cheng, A New Era in the Law of International Carriage by Air: From 
Warsaw (1929) to Montreal (1999), 53, I.C.L.Q., 838, 833-859 (2004). 
14 PATRICK ZEUNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR 15 (Grin 
Verlag 1st ed. 2013).  
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As per the Convention, to establish the liability of the carrier, 
certain conditions need to be fulfilled as mentioned under Article 
17 of the Montreal Convention. It must first be established that an 
accident has occurred which has resulted either in „death or bodily 
injury.‟15 Further, it must be established that the accident has 
occurred when the passengers were inside the aircraft or were in 
the process of embarking or disembarking from the aircraft.  
The Convention has removed the upper limit on compensation to 
passengers. In order to balance the interests of passengers and the 
aircraft carriers, the liability regime was modified to include two 
tier liabilities. As per this innovative introduction taken from the 
Japanese Agreement, the aircrafts would be „strictly liable‟ under 
any circumstance when the damages do not exceed 1,00,000 
SDR‟s.16 The passengers are not under an obligation to establish the 
fault as it is already presumed.17 To claim further damages, the 
negligence test must be fulfilled. 
The second tier of liability is „fault based liability‟. Under the 
Montreal regime, airlines are responsible only when liability is a 
result of negligent or reckless behaviour. If the airlines can establish 
that they have taken all reasonable care to prevent an accident, the 
aircraft can escape liability.18 As interpreted in the case of Air France 
v. Saks19 by the United States Supreme Court, the liability will arise 
when the injury is caused by a sudden or unexpected event, other 
than usual operation which is external to the passenger. The 
provisions of the Montreal Convention as per Article 20 relevant to 
this principle are as follows: 
When by reason of death or injury of a passenger 
compensation is claimed by a person other than the 
                                                          
15Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 
International Carriage by Air art. 20,May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309. 
16Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International 
Carriage by Air art. 21, May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309. 
17 Roberta L. Wilensky, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The Liability of Airlines 
under the Warsaw Convention for Injuries Due to Terrorism,  8 N. W.  J. INT‟L 
L. BUS. 248, 279-283 (1987-1988). 
18 GEORGE N. TOMPKINS, LIABILITY RULES APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL 
AIR TRANSPORTATION 285 (1st ed. 2002). 
19  Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985). 
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passenger, the carrier shall likewise be wholly or 
partly exonerated from its liability to the extent that 
it proves that the damage was caused or contributed 
to by the negligence or other wrongful act or 
omission of that passenger.20 
The test to determine the liability has not changed since the 
Warsaw Convention and has largely remained the same. The 
Courts in the United States have interpreted this test to mean wilful 
misconduct on part of the airlines. In the case of American Airlines v. 
Ulen,21 the Court held that: 
Now, wilful misconduct is not, as I have said, 
merely misconduct, but wilful misconduct. So if the 
carrier, or its employees or agents, wilfully 
performed any act with the knowledge that the 
performance of that act was likely to result in injury 
to a passenger, or performed that act with reckless 
and wanton disregard of its probable consequences, 
then that would constitute wilful misconduct.22 
This is clearly in conformity with Article 20 of the Montreal 
Convention as it makes the aircraft carriers liable for wrongful acts 
and acts of negligence.23 Further in the more recent case of Piamba 
Cortes v. American Airlines, the United States Court of Appeals has 
broadened the scope of liability.24 According to this, the 
commission or omission of an act that is likely to cause injury to 
passengers and threaten their safety would make the carrier liable 
to pay compensation.25 
                                                          
20Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International 
Carriage by Air art. 20, May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309. 
21   American Airlines, 186 F.2d 529, (DC Cir. 1949). 
22 American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (1949). 
23 af Irene Larsen, Regime of Liability in Private International Air Law - with 
Focus on the Warsaw System and the Montreal Convention of 28 May 1999, 
JURIDISKINSTITUT: PART OF SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, 
http://law.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_jura/dokumenter/forsknin
g/rettid/2002/speciale-20020002.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).  
24 Piamba Cortes, 177 F.3d 1272 (1999). 
25 Id. 
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These tests assist in making the passengers unburdened of the farce 
of establishing the fault and relieving the burden of proof thereby 
shifting the onus on to the carrier. It is also only in exceptional 
circumstances that negligence can exonerate the carrier either 
partly or in full. 
In the light of this discussion, the author shall now proceed to 
determine the liability of Malaysian Airlines towards the families of 
the passengers who lost their lives in the MH 17air crash. 
The Scope of Liability of Malaysian Airlines 
In the aforementioned paragraphs, it has been established that 
there is a two tier liability regime for passengers. The first tier holds 
the aircraft carrier strictly liable and the aircraft carriers must pay 
the victims interim compensation. The Malaysian Airlines, 
according to the Montreal Convention is required to pay a sum of 
$US183,000 and it has already paid $US50,000 to all families.26 The 
Malaysian Airlines has pledged to pay the remainder of the 
amount also. 
The passengers may be entitled to more compensation from the 
second tier of liability under the Montreal regime. In order to 
invoke the second tier to determine the liability, it must be shown 
that the injury caused was not as a result of negligent or wrongful 
act of the aircraft carrier.27 Let us now examine the conduct of 
Malaysian Airlines preceding the air crash. 
The violence in Crimea erupted in 2013 and many airliners have 
been avoiding the conflict ridden zone. The rebels have downed 
multiple Ukrainian military aircrafts and it was common 
knowledge that they were in possession of anti aircraft missile 
weapons.28 
                                                          
26MH 17 Compensation Could Hit $1 Billion in Latest Disaster for Malaysia 
Airlines, NEWS.COM.AU (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.news.com.au/ 
travel/travel-updates/MH 17-compensation-could-hit-1nbspbillion-in-
latest-disaster-for-malaysia-airlines/story-fnizu68q-1227000111037. 
27John Balfour, The Montreal Convention 1999 - A Solution To The Limitations 
Of The Warsaw Convention 3 INT‟L TRAVEL L.J., 143-147 (1999).  
28 NEWS.COM.AU, supra note 4. 
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At this juncture, the author would like to draw attention to the 
provisions of the Chicago Convention, 1944 which vests the 
responsibility of ensuring the safety of aircrafts on the member 
states. This can be seen in the preamble to the Convention which 
has emphasised that the future development of international civil 
aviation is through cooperation as its abuse can become a grave 
threat to general security.29 In order to facilitate freedom of air, the 
contracting States under Article 21 of the Convention are required 
to provide air navigation facilities to aid in air navigation.30 The 
first freedom in travelling by air as laid down in Chicago 
Convention requires scheduled air services to ply only when the 
special permission or authorisation is provided.31 
In the present situation, the precarious climate in Crimea was 
informed to all the contracting state parties. The ICAO had issued 
the following directive before the accident: 
Due to the unsafe situation where more than one 
ATS provider may be controlling flights within the 
same airspace from 3 April 2014, 0600 UTC onwards, 
consideration should be given to measures to avoid 
the airspace and circumnavigate the Simferopol FIR 
with alternative routings.32 
On the basis of this, the European Aviation Safety Agency issued a 
Safety Information Bulletin on April 3, 2014 appraising member 
carriers of the security situation in Simferopol FIR (Crimean air 
space). 
In the instant case, the aircraft carrier may seem to be at fault as it 
was unmindful to fly over a conflict ridden territory that has 
                                                          
29 Convention on International Civil Aviation Preamble, Dec.07, 1944, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295. 
30 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 21, Dec. 07, 1944, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295.  
31 The International Air Services Transit Agreement art. 1, Dec. 07, 1944, 84 
U.N.T.S 389. The International Air Services Transit Agreement art. 1, Dec. 07, 1944, 84 U.N.T.S 389. 
32Luis Fonseca de Almeida, ICAO State letter on Ukraine EUR/NAT 14-
0243.TEC (FOL/CUP),ICAO, (Apr. 02, 2014),http://www.ibac.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/14-0243-Safety-of-civil-aircraft-in-
Simferopol-FIR.pdf. 
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caused this accident. However, the advisories issued by the ICAO 
are not legally binding on the aircraft carriers. 
As per Article 9 of the Chicago Convention, the contracting parties 
can cordon the portions of their airspace.33 The relevant portion of 
Article 9 reads as follows: “Each contracting State may, for reasons 
of military necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly 
the aircraft of other States.....”34 
It is submitted by the author that the accident could have been 
averted if the airspace was closed by the aviation authorities in 
Ukraine. The Malaysian Airlines and other airlines such as 
Lufthansa and Emirates operating in the route would not have had 
the necessary clearances to use the conflict ridden airspace had the 
route been closed.  
As per the instructions issued by the Ukrainian Air Traffic 
Controller (ATC), aircrafts were not permitted to fly under 32,000 
feet as the same was closed on account of conflict in Crimea.35 MH 
17 was cruising at an altitude of 33,000 feet when it was hit by a 
missile.36 According to John Cox, a former pilot and aviation safety 
consultant, the airlines flying just above the restricted altitude did 
not risk the lives of passengers as a safety margin is built in, while 
prescribing it.37 It is expedient to note that the request of the aircraft 
to shift to 35,000 feet was denied by the ATC and the disaster could 
have been averted had this been done.  
                                                          
33 Luis Fonseca de Almeida, ICAO State letter on Ukraine EUR/NAT 14-
0243.TEC (FOL/CUP),ICAO, (Apr. 02, 2014),http://www.ibac.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/14-0243-Safety-of-civil-aircraft-in-
Simferopol-FIR.pdf. 
34 Id.  
35 Dan Milmo, Downed Malaysia Airlines plane: how did it go wrong for flight 
MH 17?,THE GUARDIAN, (Jul. 17, 2014) 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2014/jul/17/malaysia-airlines-
mh17-flying-just-above-restricted-airspace. 
36 DUTCH SAFETY REPORT, supra note 7. 
37 Aviation Experts from Around the World Comment on Preliminary MH 17: 
Report, SPUTNIKNEW.COM, (Sep. 10, 2014), 
http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20140910/192804880/Aviation-Experts-From-
Around-the-World-Comment-on-Preliminary-MH 17-Report.html. 
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The above discussion clearly establishes that, the Malaysian 
Airlines had not committed any negligent or wrongful act that 
would jeopardise the safety of the passengers. It had the requisite 
clearances from Ukrainian ATC to enter the airspace over Crimea 
and it had followed the instruction of navigating over the restricted 
airspace that was closed. Although there were safety bulletins 
issued by ICAO, they were merely advisories and were not legally 
binding on the airline carriers to comply with. The question still 
remains as to who is liable for the crash. 
Role of State Parties under the Chicago Convention 
As stated earlier, the passengers cannot hold the Malaysian Airlines 
liable, and to seek remedies they can initiate an action against the 
State of Ukraine. However, this will give rise to endless litigation 
and it may take decades to compensate the passengers who 
suffered damages.  
The ICAO and the various conventions that deal with passenger 
liability are ill equipped to deal with these situations as State 
Parties can claim sovereign immunity when liability is imposed on 
them.38 The ICAO has historically exercised moderation and 
restraint when it faced situations that required the imposition of 
liability on a contracting state as it does not have the means to 
enforce its decision.39 Over the years, it has been functioning 
effectively through cooperation and it cannot reconcile the 
principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty of State Parties 
with the obligation to ensure security of aircrafts.40 
In the Lockerbie bombing case when agents of the Libyan 
government had planted bombs which detonated in air, the liability 
was affixed on the State of Libya even though President Gadaffi 
had denied legal responsibility. However, the Libyan government 
                                                          
38 S.P. Sundaram, Peace through Co-operation: The ICAO Example, 34(2) 
PEACE RESEARCH, 95-100 (2002). 
39 Eugene Sochor, ICAO and Armed Attacks against Civil Aviation 44(1) INT‟L 
J. 134-170 (1988) available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40202582. 
40 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Terror in the Skies: Approaches to Controlling 
Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation, 11(2) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF POLITICS, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 245, 245- 258 (1996). 
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taking a high moral responsibility had agreed to pay compensation 
to victims of the disaster. 
In the bombing of the Gaza International Airport and air 
navigation facilities, the legal responsibility for air crash was 
affixed on the state of Israel. Israel had cited the reason that it 
suspected Palestine was using the airport to smuggle weapons 
through the airport. The ICAO strongly condemned the acts of 
Israel and had urged it to take the burden of restoring operations in 
Israel. 
In the aftermath of the Iran Air Flight 655, when repeated requests 
were made by Iran to ICAO to intervene, the ICAO expressed 
regret for events and did not even condemn the United States for 
its actions.41 The government of Iran had to approach the 
International Court of Justice to claim compensation for the victims 
of the air crash. This could be a possible course of action in the 
present case as well.42 
There are eerie similarities between the air crash of IAF 655 and 
MH 17; let us examine this case to understand the question of 
passenger liability. In the crash of Iran Air Flight 655, an American 
warship in Iranian waters had shot down the civilian aircraft. The 
IAF 655 was navigating in the civilian aircraft route and was hit by 
a missile from USS Vincennes killing all 290 people on board.43 The 
Islamic Republic of Iran approached the International Court of 
Justice and the United States had made an out of court settlement 
                                                          
41 International Civil Aviation Organization: Resolution and Report Concerning 
the Destruction of Iran Air Airbus 3 July, 1988, 28(4)INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
MATERIALS, 896-943 (1989) available at  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20693341. 
42 International Court of Justice: Application Instituting Proceedings in Case 
Concerning Aerial Incident 3 July 1988 (Iran v. United States) 28(4) 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS, 842-846 (1989) available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20693336. 
43Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Economic Sanctions: Looking Back and Looking 
Ahead, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1931-1939 (1990). 
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of USD 61.8 million for all the victims without admitting legal 
responsibility.44 
The air traffic controller and the aviation department in Ukraine 
have clearly failed in their duty to close the airspace over conflict 
ridden area. Every contracting State of the Chicago Convention is 
under a duty to provide aircraft carriers, airspace that is safe and 
secure. Failing to do this would clearly affect the confidence of 
passengers in the aviation sector that would in turn greatly affect 
the aviation industry.45 
Further, the Ukrainian government is vicariously liable for the acts 
of its rebels in the Crimean region for shooting down MH 17with 
an anti aircraft missile. It was under a duty to ensure that security 
conditions were adequate and did not interfere with civil aviation. 
The acts of rebel forces are in violation of customary international 
law and many internationally recognized human rights covenants 
that protect civilians during times of wars.46 The State of Ukraine 
must take responsibility for their actions as the victims of the crash 
cannot sue the rebel forces for the crash.  
The victims in MH 17case may move their respective governments 
to raise an issue with the International Court of Justice on this 
matter. The jurisdiction maybe invoked under the Chicago 
Convention as per Article 84 which deals with settlement of 
disputes47 i.e. if there is a disagreement between two or more 
contracting states concerning a dispute that cannot be settled by 
negotiation then the matter may be appealed from the ICAO to the 
International Court of Justice.48 This issue would lead to a 
                                                          
44Marian Nash Leich, Denial of Liability: Ex Gratia Compensation on a 
Humanitarian Basis, THE AM. J. INT‟L L. 319, 321 (1989). 
45Associated Press, Aviation’s Terrible Week Doesn’t Mean Flying is Less Safe, 
Say Experts, PBS NEWSHOUR, (Jul. 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/aviations-terrible-week-
doesnt-mean-flying-less-safe-say-experts. 
46Alexis Flynn, Will the MH 17 Disaster Be Prosecuted as a War Crime?, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL: LAW BLOG, (Jul. 22, 2014), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/tag/mh17/.   
47 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 86, Dec. 07, 1944, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295. 
48 Id.  
Jaideep Kodali            Examining the Lacunae in the International Aviation 
85 
 
prolonged litigation as was in the case of Islamic Republic of Iran v. 
United States of America49 which albeit prematurely ended with a 
settlement, had taken 8 years to be resolved.50 
In the light of this, the author submits that, the international 
aviation regime is not adequately equipped to deal with questions 
of state responsibility for acts of unlawful interference with 
international civil aviation. Thus the victims of MH 17may have to 
wait for a long time for before the compensation, for the loss of 
their loved ones in the air crash, is granted.  
Conclusion 
Passenger liability in civil aviation is a vital area for the sustenance 
of civil aviation. The confidence in the civil aviation industry could 
be easily affected if the interests of the passengers are not 
considered. The various conventions on passenger liability do offer 
protection to passengers by letting them hold the international air 
carriers liable through a two tier liability. At one level, there is strict 
liability which is imposed on aircrafts for any act that causes death 
or bodily injury wherein it paysminimum compensation to all 
passengers. At the second level, the air carrier would be liable to 
pay any further compensation if it is established that the accident 
was a result of its act of negligence. This passenger liability regime 
has evolved from the Warsaw Convention in a progressive manner 
as passengers are now guaranteed a bare minimum compensation 
from the aircraft carriers.  
These conventions have failed to cover those instances when the 
accident takes place as a result of the interference with the civil 
aviation. There have been views put forth that the whole liability to 
compensate must be imposed on the aircraft carriers. In the humble 
opinion of the researcher, this would be rather unfair as it imposes 
a financial strain on the aircraft carriers. 
The arguments raised by the author clearly indicate the absence of 
any regulator to impose sanctions on states that do not ensure that 
their airspaces are safe. The ICAO has come into existence with an 
                                                          
49  ICJ: Aerial Incident, supra note 42. 
50 Leich, supra note 44. 
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intention to foster cooperation among states to ensure that the 
airspaces are safe for navigation. However, it has been unable to 
fulfil its obligations as its role is reduced to a mere regulator that 
looks into the commercial aspects of civil aviation. This role is left 
to the United Nations as the ICAO cannot deal with issues of 
political nature. 
If the ICAO had the power to close airspaces when there was 
impending threats to civil aviation of MH 17, the disaster could 
have been averted. Ukraine did not close the airspace as it would 
lose out on fees paid by air carriers. Hence, it is the submission of 
the author that it is the ICAO which must be given this 
responsibility and power to enforce upon the States to provide 
compensation in cases of any accidents over their air space as a 
result of any lapses on their part.  
The issues raised by the author are the need of the hour as many 
passengers could be left waiting for decades for justice and 
compensation. The minimum expectation of the families of those 
who died in the accident is the award of a substantial amount of 
compensation. It is unfair to make them knock at the doors of 
justice to claim compensation; especially when the resolution of 
disputes could take decades. 
Further, the absence of international regulations to ensure the 
liability of sovereign states for damages would affect the passenger 
confidence in air travel and reforms suggested by the author are 
necessary for the growing future of the aviation industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
